This paper investigates the joint impact of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition and Ricardian comparative advantages on the structure of trade and industries. We develop a trade model with several industries employing local factors.
Introduction
For more than a decade, many economic scholars have explained industrial clustering and industrial specialization as the result of Chamberlinian forces (Henderson 1988 , Krugman 1991 ). Based on monopolistic competition, increasing returns and industry spillovers, this interpretation helps to understand agglomeration processes taking place in regions like the Silicon Valley, Hollywood and Northern Italy by which Þrms gather in regions with no particular natural advantage (Porter 1990 , Saxenian 1994 ). This interpretation also allows to highlight the possible lock-in problems taking place in less developed regions lacking initial manufacturing bases (Krugman and Venables, 1995 ). century in the United Kingdom] were a much stronger inßuence on location decisions than were market potential and scale economies." As a consequence, a theory reconciling the Chamberlinian and Ricardian approaches is called for.
For this purpose, we propose a model that encompasses both Chamberlinian forces and Ricardian productivity advantages. Our main objective is to check whether the traditional properties of Chamberlinian models hold when some industries beneÞt from location advantages or country' speciÞc factors. In particular, we investigate the impact of the local factor advantages on the possibility of endogenous asymmetries, catastrophic changes and hysteresis in the distribution of Þrms. In line with the international trade and 'new economic geography' literature, we want to provide information about the changes in trade pattern and Þrms distribution in a 'globalization' or 'trade integration' scenario where trade barriers decrease over time. As most contributions in 'new economic geog-raphy' resort to numerical simulations and limit their study to subsets of equilibria, our side objective is to develop a model with good analytical tractability which allows us to characterize and study the full set of equilibria.
Our model extends Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Picard and Zeng (2005) to the case of multiple industries and local factor advantages. In each industry, manufacturing Þrms produce differentiated goods under increasing returns to scale and sell their products in two countries. Manufacturing Þrms are run by entrepreneurs (or skilled workers) who can freely move with their Þrm across countries. Manufacturing production requires the use of an immobile, local factor whose productivity differs across countries and whose returns are spent locally. Yet, local factors can also be employed in a traditional sector where traditional Þrms produce varieties of traditional goods at constant returns to scale. Local factors can be natural resources like land, minerals, energy; they can also be interpreted as human resources like immobile unskilled labor. Traditional activities may include agriculture, forestry, mine extraction.
Our results can be summarized in three points. First, we isolate the effect of locational advantages by focusing on economies with many industries and small trade costs. In this case, Chamberlinian forces yield second order effects and, provided that Ricardo's comparative advantages exist, each industry locates in the country where the local factor is relatively more productive. When some industries have no comparative advantages, Chamberlinian forces come back into play and consumers' taste for manufacturing variety implies that all but possibly one industry agglomerate in a single country.
Second, we present the case of a single-industry locating in two countries, one of them offering a productivity advantage in the local factor. We show that the distribution of Þrms is biased toward the advantaged country. Agglomeration stems from two distinct forces, Hence, although some countries may offer more productive local factors to an industry, they may not succeed in becoming net exporter of the goods produced by that industry.
Finally, in an urban economic interpretation of the model, some equilibrium distributions of Þrms may represent endogenous urban hierarchies whereby one city supplies more varieties of each manufacturing good than the other (see Tabuchi and Thisse 2006) .
Related literature:
The present paper relates to the international trade literature from a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint. On the theoretical viewpoint, the research community has generally devoted a separate attention to trade models with comparative advantages and speciÞc factors and those with increasing returns to scale. Before the 80s, a large strand of the literature discusses Ricardo's and Heckscher-Ohlin theory that rely on relative differences in productivity or endowments of local factors. In particular, Dornbusch et al. (1977) predict in a continuum goods model that Þrms smoothly partition according to their comparative advantage. Smooth changes in trade cost then smoothly alter the distribution of Þrms. Since the 80s, many authors have recognized the relevance of increasing returns to scale in the context of international trade (e.g. Krugman, 1979; Helpman and Krugman, 1985) and in the context of regional science (e.g. Krugman, 1991; and Fujita et al., 1999b) . In this literature, the Þrms distribution is subject to catastrophic changes, endogenous asymmetries and hysteresis as trade costs change.
More recently, economists have tried to link the two theories by proposing 'new eco-nomic geography' models that include different kinds of local factor speciÞcity. In the context of a single industry and in the presence of local factors that are not country speciÞc, it is now well known that Þrms disperse for high trade costs, agglomerate for intermediate costs and may 're-disperse' for small costs (see Tabuchi and Glaeser (1997, 1999) show that more than 20% of observed geographic concentration can be explained by a small set of observable natural advantages such as abundance of electricity, gas, coal, cattle, skilled and unskilled workers. Craft and Mulatu (2005) show the signiÞcant impact of coal abundance in the location of industries during the 1871-1931 industrialization period in the UK and they highlight the dominating role of local factor endowment during the 19th century. Using a several-century data set, Davis and Weinstein (2002) conÞrm the dominant role of local factors in the concentration of Japanese economic activity while they report a substantial rise in the degree of spatial dispersion during the last century, which might be accounted for by increasing returns. The paper is organized at it follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 explains the various specialization, agglomeration and dispersion forces. Section 4 concentrates on the case for small trade costs, while Sections 5 discusses industrial location in a framework of one industry. Section 6 is the main part of this paper which fully characterizes the industrial location patterns for the case of two industries. Section 7 concludes.
The model
The model includes two sectors and two countries (or regions): home H and foreign F . In the Þrst sector, referred as the traditional sector, Þrms produce at constant returns to scale and sell their products in perfectly competitive markets. The traditional sector may for instance include agriculture, construction, etc. In the second sector, called manufactures, and λ * k ≡ 1 − λ k be the proportion in the foreign country. We superscript variables pertaining to the foreign country by an asterisk * and we expose economic relationships for the home country, symmetric relationships holding for the foreign country. Furthermore we will denote variables pertaining to the traditional sector by a prime symbol '.
Each country is endowed with local, immobile factors which differ across countries and which are owned by local residents. To capture the idea of Ricardian advantages, we assume that local factors differ across space in productivity but not in quantity. At the same time, to concentrate on the issue of location advantages in the manufacturing sector we assume away productivity differences in the traditional sector. Hence, we assume that each country hosts A individuals who each own a unit of local, immobile factor. On the one hand, the local factor can be used at unit productivity in the traditional sector in any country. On the other hand, the local factor can be used in the manufacturing sector as a Þxed input whose productivity differs across countries and industries. More precisely, each manufacturing Þrm in industry k requires φ k and φ * k units of local factor to produce in the domestic and foreign countries, where φ k 6 = φ * 
and where q k and p k are the demand of and price paid by a home consumer for a manufacturing variety produced by a home Þrm belonging to industry k and where
is the domestic price index for the goods produced by industry k.
Similarly we can get the individual demand for varieties of the traditional sector. 
where
Manufacturing Þrms: The total demand for a variety produced by a manufacturing
Þrm consists of the aggregate demand of individuals located in both countries. Since each entrepreneur follows his/her manufacturing Þrm, the number of domestic consumers is equal to A + λK where λ ≡ P K k=1 λ k /K measures the proportion of entrepreneurs locating at home. Therefore, a home entrepreneur in industry k earns a wage equal to
where τ is the trade cost paid in numéraire, (p * k , q * k ) are the foreign consumer price and individual consumption for the home entrepreneur's variety and w 0 the price of the domestic local factor.
Each home entrepreneur chooses its domestic and export prices (p k , p * k ) taking other Þrms' prices as given. The optimal prices set by a home entrepreneur of industry k and selling in the domestic or foreign country are given by
His/her wage writes as
Traditional Þrms: In each country, a traditional sector uses a constant returns to scale technology to produce one variety of a traditional good. Traditional goods may differ according to countries' endowments. For instance, countries endowed with land and sun may specialize in the production of fruits and wine, those endowed with forests in woodcraft, ... As usual in the economic geography literature, we assume that local factors are used at unit productivity in the traditional sector and that trade cost for such goods is nil. As a consequence, the domestic traditional good has the same price in both countries and this price is equal to the price of the local factor: w 0 ≡ p 0 = p 0 * . Therefore, the individual consumption of the domestic traditional variety is identical across countries:
The total demand for the domestic traditional good is thus equal to q 0 M, i.e.
The supply of this good is equal to the number of units of local factor that are not used by manufacturing Þrms. When demand equals supply we get:
By (1), domestic prices of traditional goods and thus domestic local factor prices are then given by
Domestic factor price increases with larger demand intensity for traditional varieties (a 0 )
and it also rises with larger local factor usage by home manufacturing Þrms (λ k φ k ). In addition, the tension in the domestic factor market is transmitted to the foreign factor market when traditional varieties are substitutable (c 0 > 0): domestic factor prices indeed increase with larger domestic factor requirements set by foreign manufacturing
In this paper we restrict our analysis to the situation in which consumers always purchase a positive amount of every manufacturing and traditional variety. Hence, we impose q > 0, q 0 > 0 and w 0 > 0 for any λ k ∈ [0, 1]. SpeciÞcally, we impose the following restrictions:
A > max
Condition (3) guarantees that the demand of manufacturing export is large enough to compensate for their trade cost. The second condition (4) says that the link of consumers to the traditional sector is large enough. It is sufficient to ensure that the demand of each traditional variety is positive to avoid the shutdown of the traditional sector in any country. The last condition insures a sufficiently large supply of local factor so that some local factor is always used by the traditional sector.
Agglomeration and dispersion forces
In this section we present the agglomeration and dispersion forces generated by the entrepreneurs who decide the location of Þrms. We Þrst derive the entrepreneurs' indirect utility and we then discuss the impact of Þrms' distribution on entrepreneurs incentive to locate in a country. We then deÞne the equilibrium and stability concept that we use in the next sections.
Entrepreneurs' utility: Similarly to Ottaviano et al. (2002) , the indirect utility of entrepreneurs employed in industry k includes their consumption surplus from manufactured and traditional goods, their wages and their initial numéraire endowments e q 0 :
Entrepreneurs' incentives to move between countries are given by their utility differential:
Note at the outset that S 0 − S 0 * = 0 because the access to traditional varieties is the same in every country. Therefore relocation incentives do not depend directly on the traditional sector. Nevertheless, this sector generates a dispersion and agglomeration force in the economy which we now describe in more detail.
One can compute that consumption surplus from manufactured goods is equal to
and that the surplus differential for all manufactures is equal to
Obviously, under the restrictions (3), the coefficient in this expression is positive. An increase in the numbers of Þrms in a country increases the surplus from consumption for all consumers of that country. As more Þrms agglomerate, consumers beneÞt from a larger number of varieties and smaller prices. This is an agglomeration force.
Location incentives: By (2), entrepreneurs' wage differential is equal to
The Þrst term embeds the demand linkage by which Þrms' revenues and entrepreneurs' wages are larger in the country where Þrms agglomerate. This is the Chamberlinian agglomeration force. It increases with the aggregate size of entrepreneur's population in country H. The second term represents the negative effect of product market crowding in the manufacturing industry k. When Þrms belonging to this industry agglomerate in a country, they face tougher competition which decreases prices and entrepreneurs' wages in the industry. This dispersion force increases with larger trade cost τ and total population
M . The last term denotes the rent differential that entrepreneurs leave to the owners of local factors. When the local factor consists of (unskilled) labor, this represents the (unskilled) workers' wage. One computes that
The coefficient in the Þrst term is positive under (4). This formula embeds several effects that we describe here. The Þrst two terms represent a constant bias towards the country with location advantages. For the sake of the explanation, Þrst suppose that comparative advantages are equally distributed so that φ = φ * . Then, the Þrst two terms are negative if country H has a location advantage in industry k: φ k < φ * k . So, local factor rents are smaller in country H and entrepreneurs earn more in that country. When location advantages are not equally distributed so that φ 6 = φ * , the direction of the bias also depends on the global location advantage of a country: the bias toward the home country indeed increases when the ratio φ/φ * decreases. This happens for instance when the home country is more productive in every industry.
The third term in the above expression represents a dispersion force generated by the use of immobile, local factors. Entrepreneurs do not like to locate in a same country because they are likely to exhaust the local factor supply and to raise the rents to the owners of local factors. By dispersing they get access to a larger supply of factors and they obtain smaller factor prices. This dispersion force is readily observed in the absence
the above expression increases when
Þrms agglomerate in the domestic country. As the demand for the local factor rises, local factor rents increase and entrepreneurs earn less.
The last term translates the Ricardian force resulting for the gains from comparative advantages. It is indeed observed through the relocation of industries with opposite location advantages when the term (φ l − φ * l )(φ k − φ * k ) is negative. In this case, efficiency gains obtain because industry k locates in its most efficient country while industry l also locates in this most efficient place. The demands for local factors decrease in both countries so that the local factor rents drop and entrepreneurs' wages rise.
Observe that all components of entrepreneurs' utility differential are linear functions of λ k (∀k). Some lines of computation show that the entrepreneurs' utility differential is equal to the following linear function:
and where
Note that Γ(τ ) > z (τ ) and that z and Γ are concave in τ . Moreover, under the restriction (3), Γ(τ ) is always strictly increasing. Meanwhile, z(τ ) strictly increases at
Concerning Φ k , the fraction of the second term is positive according to (4).
Location Equilibrium: In accordance to the literature we deÞne the equilibrium to be a distribution of Þrms in each industry such that factors and goods markets clear and such that no entrepreneur is enticed to relocate. That is, an equilibrium is a vector
¢ that fulÞlls one of these three conditions:
Furthermore, an equilibrium distribution of Þrms is asymptotically stable if any small deviation from the equilibrium distribution leads back to the equilibrium distribution according to the following dynamics of entrepreneurs:
Hence, an interior distribution of Þrms will be stable if domestic entrepreneurs' utility falls as they agglomerate more at home. Conversely a distribution of Þrms will be unstable if entrepreneurs' utility increases as they locate further in that country.
We Þrst discuss the issue of comparative advantages in the general model when trade costs are small. Then we concentrate on the issue of location advantages in a one-industry model and on the issue of comparative advantages in a two-industry model.
Small trade costs
When trade costs are small, the distribution of Þrms has a negligible impact on prices and on consumers' surplus. Location decisions are thus driven by local factor rents and thus by comparative advantages. Indeed, when τ = 0, entrepreneurs' location incentives are equal to
Therefore, entrepreneurs tend to locate in the country with the lowest cost of local factors. From the second equality, one observes that entrepreneurs locate according to their relative local factor usages φ k /φ * k . Given the equilibrium relative factor prices w 0 * /w 0 , entrepreneurs belonging to industries with small relative local factor usages φ k /φ * k will locate at home whereas others will locate in the foreign country. This is Ricardo's argument of comparative advantages, which has already been proposed in a continuous good model by Dornbusch et al. (1977) . Entrepreneurs here save factor costs by locating in the country where local factors are relatively more efficient. The present discussion implies that countries specialize in their comparative advantages in the Þnal stages of integration process when τ is small.
When trade costs are small but not zero, location decisions are still driven by local factor rents in almost all industries; comparative advantages determine the location of industries as in the previous paragraph. Yet there may exist a set of industries having no comparative advantages as their relative factor requirement may be identical, i.e.
. Then, at the equilibrium, the two industries cannot simultaneously disperse in both countries. That is, at least one industry agglomerates.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Hence, in contrast to the case of symmetric industries, only one industry may disperse in the equilibrium. If two industries have the same relative factor requirements, they locate according to their absolute factor requirements. The reason does not lie in the distribution of local factor rents as we presented above but it rests on the consumers' taste for product variety. Indeed, entrepreneurs are able to beneÞt from more local varieties when they locate in the country with the lowest local factor requirement. To understand this idea, suppose that industries k and l have no comparative advantages and that industry k is more productive than industry l. That is, φ l = zφ k and φ * l = zφ * k with z > 1. Then, consider the following relocation of Þrms which does affect none of the local factor markets: swap z Þrms of industry k for one Þrm of industry l in domestic country and swap one Þrm of industry l for z Þrms of industry k in the foreign country. Doing so, we keep the same demand for local factors and thus the same factor prices; local factors' rents play no role. In this exercise, we destroy (−z + 1) varieties at home and create (z − 1) varieties in the other country. Therefore, entrepreneurs beneÞt from more local varieties in the foreign country. Because local varieties are cheaper than foreign ones, entrepreneurs are enticed to move there.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose small enough trade costs. Then, at the equilibrium, at most one industry (say k) disperses. Industries l with strictly smaller (larger) relative factor
If an industry l has the same relative factor requirements as the industry k,(i.e. φ l /φ * l = φ k /φ * k ), then it agglomerates in one of the two countries.
To sum up, when trade costs are small enough, comparative advantages drive the shape of industrial location and lead to the clustering of Þrms of a same industry in the same location. There thus exists specialization according to comparative advantages. Still, local factor scarcity entices Þrms to disperse industry by industry. Therefore, comparative advantages generate an agglomeration force within each industry and a dispersion force across industries.
Single industry and location advantage
The study of agglomeration forces in a single industry is a well-known exercise in economic geography. In this section we discuss the benchmark case of an industry that has a location advantage in the domestic country. We show that whereas location advantages increase the likelihood of agglomeration, small changes in trade barriers are not necessarily associated with catastrophic and irreversible changes in Þrm locations.
2
In this section we assume K = 1 and λ = λ 1 and w.l.o.g. we set
where the parameter ∆ ∈ (0, 1) measures the location advantage of the home country and the parameter ϕ > 0 the Þrms' average local factor requirement. The characterization of the location equilibrium requires to study the function ∆V = Φ + (λ − 1 2 )δ where
Note that Φ is also strictly positive under restriction (4).
Let b λ ≡ 1/2 − Φ/δ be the distribution of Þrms that yields zero utility differential for entrepreneurs. This is the candidate distribution for an interior location equilibrium. For this equilibrium to be stable, it is required that δ < 0. Thenλ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if δ < −2Φ. Using the deÞnition of δ, we readily get the following characterization of stable equilibria. 
For τ ∈ [τ 1 , τ 2 ], demand linkages are so strong that agglomeration may occur in any 
This inequality is true at ∆ = 0 and false at ∆ = 1. Because its LHS is a quadratic function of ∆, there exits a unique root b
Hence, for small transport costs, Þrms agglomerate at home only if the domestic location advantage ∆ is larger than b ∆ 1 . In that case, the location advantage dominates the product market crowding effect. Otherwise, the industry disperses with a bias towards the domestic country. Furthermore, it is readily shown that b ∆ 1 increases with larger average local factor requirements ϕ. Any rise in ϕ therefore reduces the likelihood of agglomeration. So, keeping the ratio of factor requirements φ 1 /φ * 1 Þxed (which is implied by ∆ =constant), a rise in average or total factor requirements ϕ entices Þrms to disperse more. In this situation, local factor prices indeed increase and reduce entrepreneurs' proÞts. Therefore, entrepreneurs become more sensitive to differences in local factor prices and they avoid locating in countries where Þrms agglomerate and generate too high local factor prices.
Finally, we discuss the 'globalization' or 'trade integration' process where trade costs τ fall from large to small values. Let us take again the example described in Figure 1 This section Þrstly describes the nature of comparative advantages, secondly discusses the location incentives of entrepreneurs and the associated agglomeration and dispersion forces. We then characterize the location equilibria and Þnally relate them to the issues of regional specialization and trade integration.
For the sake of simplicity we focus on the case of two industries: K = 2 and we assume symmetric comparative advantages:
, where ϕ > 0 and ∆ ∈ (0, 1) are two constants. Hence, the parameter ∆ measures the comparative advantage that the home country gives to industry k = 1 as well as the comparative advantage that the foreign country gives to industry k = 2. The parameter ϕ measures the Þrms' average productivity. 3 Thus,
3 Indeed, the parameter ϕ measures the average productivity of Þrms within countries (ϕ = φ/2 = φ * /2) and across countries (ϕ = (
Proposition 1 allows us to determine the equilibrium distribution of Þrms when τ tends to zero. Indeed we know that at least one industry agglomerates. However, because industries are perfectly symmetric with respect to their location advantages, they must be alike at the equilibrium. Henceforth, when τ is small enough, each industry must necessarily agglomerate in the country with its comparative advantage. The equilibrium distribution is such that λ E = (1, 0).
Entrepreneurs' location incentives: Location equilibria are determined by the system
that expresses entrepreneurs' relocation process according to their location incentives ∆V k , The stability properties of this system are determined by the eigenvalues of the matrix (δ kl ) which are computed as it follows:
where ρ 2 is always negative. A candidate equilibrium distribution is given by the interior
This distribution of Þrms will obviously yield the unique equilibrium if all eigenvalues are negative and if it is an interior solution. That is, if ρ 1 < 0 and b λ < 1. This case is shown in the left hand panel of Figure 2 where entrepreneurs' incentives point in the direction of the distribution ( b λ, 1 − b λ). If the eigenvalue ρ 1 is positive, the system dλ k /dt = ∆V k is unstable and entrepreneurs are enticed to agglomerate in some country.
When ρ 1 is positive but not too large, entrepreneurs in one industry agglomerate whereas those in the other industry disperse. This case is shown in the central panel of Figure 2 where entrepreneurs' incentives point in the direction of the two distributions ( e λ, 0) and
When ρ 1 is large enough, entrepreneurs may agglomerate in a single country or in separate On the other hand, the negative eigenvalue ρ 2 measures the incentives to locate according to comparative advantages. For instance, when trade costs are nil, the demand linkage and the product market crowding do not play any role; then the dispersion force induced by local factor markets combines with the force resulting from comparative advantages.
The equilibrium distribution of Þrms is equal to λ E = (1, 0), which respects dispersion (λ 1 + λ 2 = 1) and comparative advantages (λ 1 > λ 2 ). When trade costs are larger and/or when comparative advantages are smaller, the distribution of Þrms is interior and equal Figure 2 ). The gains from comparative advantages entice Þrms avoid any location away from this distribution. When b λ is larger than one, comparative advantages entice Þrms of a same industry to locate within the country offering the best productivity.
The following Lemma presents the full set of location equilibria as a function of the eigenvectors. (2) Suppose then that ρ 2 < −2Φ. Then, if ρ 1 < 0, industries asymmetrically disperse
, one industry disperses while the other agglomerates (λ E ∈ {( e λ, 0), (1, 1 − e λ)}); otherwise, all industries agglomerate in the same country
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
Lemma 2 shows that there exist parameter conÞgurations that induce multiple equilibria either with full or partial agglomeration. Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium conÞgu-rations according to the eigenvalues ρ 1 and ρ 2 . Regional specialization: Does a country specialize in the industry to which it offers a comparative advantage as predicted by Ricardo? A quick look at the equilibria λ E = ( b λ, 1 − b λ) and λ E ∈ {( e λ, 0), (1, 1 − e λ)} allows us to demonstrate two possible situations.
In the Þrst equilibrium, countries are obviously specialized according to their comparative advantages because b λ > 1/2. However the opposite result is true in the second equilibrium.
Indeed, while one country hosts all Þrms of the industry to which it offers a comparative advantage, it also hosts a share of the other industry. In contrast, the other country hosts a share of the sole industry to which it offers a comparative advantage. Hence, the latter country hosts fewer Þrms but is fully specialized whereas the former country hosts more Þrms and is less specialized. Therefore, the less industrialized country is more specialized while the more industrialized one is less specialized! This result was already shown by Ricci (1999) . The intuition is that the more industrialized country yields more consumption surplus which compensates for the entrepreneurs' loss from not are specialized according to their comparative advantages. In the equilibria λ E ∈ {( e λ, 0), (1, 1− e λ)}, the less industrialized country is fully specialized according to its comparative advantage, while the more industrialized one is less specialized.
Globalization or trade integration:
We are now equipped to study the impact of trade costs on the location of Þrms and industries. The impact of trade costs can be obtained by drawing the locus of the eigenvalues ρ 1 and ρ 2 when we decrease the trade cost τ from τ trade to zero. An example of such a locus is displayed in Figure 3 . As noted in the beginning of this section, industries agglomerate in the locale with their comparative advantages when τ = 0. In this case, the locus of ρ 1 and ρ 2 lies in the North-West area where ρ 1 ≤ 0 and ρ 2 ≥ −2Φ. Now as τ falls from its largest admissible value (τ trade ), ρ 1 Þrstly increases and then decreases whereas ρ 2 always increases. So, as τ falls, the equilibrium locus goes to North vertically, and Þrstly goes to East then turns back to West horizontally. In the example of Figure 4 , the equilibrium distribution of
Þrms sequentially enters in the three following regimes as τ falls: Concerning the second type of equilibrium, one can show that the function e λ may increase or decrease as τ falls within the relevant interval of trade costs. As shown in Figure 4 , there may exist a value of trade cost e τ such that e λ increases with τ for τ < e τ and decreases otherwise. Therefore, if λ E ∈ {( e λ, 0), (1, 1 − e λ)} and τ < e τ , Þrms more intensively concentrate according to the comparative advantages as trade costs fall.
However, if λ E ∈ {( e λ, 0), (1, 1 − e λ)} and τ > e τ , the Þrms in one industry agglomerate in the country offering a comparative advantage whereas the Þrms in the other industry may locate according to or in opposition to comparative advantages.
It is also interesting to study the two types of transitions in the scenario presented in Figure 4 . First, note that the transitions between the equilibria
and λ E ∈ {( e λ, 0), (1, 1 − e λ)} are discontinuous and that they imply that when trade costs fall, some industry discontinuously relocates in the country that does not offer a comparative advantage! To see this, note that it can readily be checked that e λ < b λ iff b λ < 1. Consider then the transition from
). In this case, industry 2 agglomerates in the foreign country while industry 1 also concentrates further in the foreign country although the latter offers no comparative advantage to this industry.
The same argument holds for the transition from
Second, the transitions between the equilibria λ E ∈ {( e λ, 0), ( We summarize this discussion in the following proposition. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a two-country model that embeds Chamberlinian monopolistic competition and Ricardian advantages through countries' differences in local factor productivities. The model incorporates four forces: demand linkages, product market crowding, local factor congestion and comparative advantages. Our main conclusion is 
Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
We study the stability of the location of the two industries (k, l) holding the distribution of other industries constant. Let φ l = zφ k , z 6 = 1. Therefore the stability of the sub-system made of the two industries (k, l) is given by the expression 
Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the following equivalent conclusion.
Lemma 3 (1) If ρ 1 < 0 and ρ 2 < −2Φ, then ( b λ, 1 − b λ) is the only stable equilibrium, whereλ is given by (10);
(2) If 0 < ρ 1 < 2Φ and ρ 2 < −2Φ, then ( e λ, 0) and (1, 1 − e λ) are the only stable equilibria, where e λ is given by (11); (2) Since 0 < ρ 1 < 2Φ and ρ < −2Φ, we have δ 11 = (ρ 1 +ρ 2 )/2 < 0. Therefore e λ of (11) is in (0, 1). Furthermore, equilibria ( e λ, 0) and (1, 1 − e λ) are stable because δ 22 = δ 11 < 0.
On the other hand, there is no stable interior equilibrium because ρ 1 > 0. Furthermore, other (corner) equilibria are not stable when the equilibria ( e λ, 0) and (1, 1 − e λ) are stable due to the linearity of our dynamic system. (4) Since ρ 2 > −2Φ, it holds that b λ > 1. Therefore, there is no interior equilibrium. If δ 11 > 0, then e λ < 0 due to ρ 1 < 2Φ. If δ 11 < 0, then e λ > 1 due to ρ 2 > 2Φ. Therefore, there is no equilibria of type ( e λ, 0) and (1, 1 − e λ) where e λ ∈ (0, 1). Distribution (1, 1) and (0, 0) are not equilibrium because ρ 1 < 2Φ. Distribution (0, 1) is not stable because ρ 2 < 0 < 2Φ. Finally, distribution (1, 0) is a stable equilibrium because ρ 2 > −2Φ. 
Appendix 3: Transitions
The set of transitions in location patterns associated to Lemma 2 is displayed in the {( e λ, 0), (1, 1− e λ)} directly to λ E ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}) and the 'discontinuous' transitions when there exists other 'continuous' transitions (e.g. in the transition from λ E ∈ {(0, 0),
(1, 0), (1, 1)} to λ E ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, the transition (0, 0) → (1, 1) is discontinuous whereas the transition (0, 0) → (0, 0) is continuous). Despite those restrictions we obtain eleven admissible chains of transitions when τ falls. Each entry in Table 2 corresponds to a distinct set of economic parameters. The second line in this table corresponds to the example depicted in Figure 3 . 
